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Abstract: The products and services designed for Smart Cities provide the necessary tools to
improve the management of modern cities in a more efficient way. These tools need to gather
citizens’ information about their activity, preferences, habits, etc. opening up the possibility of
tracking them. Thus, privacy and security policies must be developed in order to satisfy and manage
the legislative heterogeneity surrounding the services provided and comply with the laws of the
country where they are provided. This paper presents one of the possible solutions to manage this
heterogeneity, bearing in mind these types of networks, such as Wireless Sensor Networks, have
important resource limitations. A knowledge and ontology management system is proposed to
facilitate the collaboration between the business, legal and technological areas. This will ease the
implementation of adequate specific security and privacy policies for a given service. All these
security and privacy policies are based on the information provided by the deployed platforms and
by expert system processing.
Keywords: Smart Cities; Smart Grid; Internet of Things; Wireless Sensor Network; security services;
privacy; personal data protection; Utility Matrix
1. Introduction
A smart city represents a leap forward in increasing a city’s sustainable growth and
strengthening city functions to provide a greater quality of life for citizens than a traditional city.
It is predicted that there will be a great quantity of “objects” interacting continuously with citizens
and which can be both collectors and distributors of information regarding their mobility, energy
consumption, etc. As a result, cyber and real worlds are strongly linked in a smart city. Thus those
“objects” can act as sensors and actuators to interact with the smart city [1,2]. New services based on
information gathered and recorded from multiple sources can be deployed when needed. The loss of
trust and privacy of citizens could be an obstacle in the interaction between smart city and citizens.
Citizens with their mobile phones and other smart devices, such as wearable devices, can also act as
sensors, and they can give information about their movements, habits, preferences, etc. One of the
most significant perceived risks for citizens is the tracking of their movements and their activities
through the information gathered by the objects. They also fear being included in a list of personal
profiles. Analyzing these data in order to identify behaviors and habits of people, yields information
that could be used in many areas, mainly in marketing.
The set of services in a smart city can be viewed as a holistic compound service comprising
all single services such as urban mobility, energy consumption, critical infrastructures, public safety,
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health etc. As a result, using the appropriate Smart City technologies, sustainable management of
the whole is made possible. There are many stakeholders in a Smart City, each one having their own
interests. Among the major stakeholders are sponsors, services operators, and the monitored entities
(some of which may be citizens). Stakeholders’ interests may conflict with each other. The solution of
these situations represents a challenge for legislative and regulatory entities. Therefore it is necessary
to implement coherent trust and privacy policies based on legislation, since they are able to reconcile
the rights and interests of all stakeholders and protect the citizens from infringements of their rights
and invasions of their privacy. Nevertheless, this new range of services also requires the development
of new communication architectures to minimize their vulnerability and ensure the maximum
protection to citizens. Therefore it is necessary to develop and research about new mechanisms to
provide safe and reliable environments. Concepts such as “Privacy by Design (PBD)” [3] and the
mechanisms to facilitate positive or negative consent are being researched in order to build confidence
and allow the users to choose. This idea also requires the participation of actors and stakeholders
to protect against the possible chaos if a mass deployment of these technologies were to occur.
Thus, for the PBD seven principles are defined [3], these deal with proactivity; prevention; privacy
settings configured by default and integrated into the design, etc. They also deal with the visibility,
transparency and designs needed to focus on the user and respect people’s privacy.
This paper proposes two goals: (1) A platform to integrate the functionalities and control of the
services to acquire enough capacity to generate new applications; (2) An expert system to solve the
diverse legislation issues and provide options to generate a policy of trust and privacy mechanisms
to apply.
Currently, several Interconnection and Cooperation Platforms (ICP) are being developed. These
platforms also have to allow management of trust and privacy policies. One of them is the
“ACCUS Project [4]”. The Adaptive Cooperative Control in Urban (sub)Systems (ACCUS) platform
aims to implement three innovations: (1) integration and coordination platform for urban systems;
(2) new control architecture for urban subsystems and (3) general methodologies and tools for
creating applications.
This paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 shows existing related work in this
research field, Section 3 shows an brief overview on ACCUS platform in the smart city, Section 4
discusses the major challenges to privacy and trust in that environment. Section 5 shows the needed
elements for privacy and trust policy implementation, and in Section 6 these are applied to an
example of a Smart Service in a smart city. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the major
contributions of this paper and future work.
2. Related Work
The 2012 during our investigation activities about security and privacy in the “Internet of
Things” field we were able to verify the huge interdependence between the selection of the
mechanisms and the security and privacy countermeasures, the right legislation that must be applied
to a determined IoT service and the commercial need for the cost to be as low as reasonably possible.
After a study on the state of the art about this topic reported in previous publications [5,6],
three different kinds of contributions were found: (1) state of the art regarding commercial
products and businesses focused on the creation of new ideas and services to be commercialized;
(2) technology-based state of the art, which provides better and more efficient solutions by its natural
progress; (3) legislative state of the art, which is not always homogeneous for the different markets
where it is expected to be used, and with a very significant impact on the companies related to the
sectors where they perform their activities. The timing that is required for each of the groups is very
different and they do not always move at the same speed, thus resulting in potential risks for people,
critical infrastructures, etc.
The study that was carried out started by analysing the selection process of the security and
privacy mechanisms that were made during the specification and design process of several products
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and services made by two relevant companies of the sector. These companies, although unwilling to
be identified in this manuscript, nevertheless provided us their support. Mechanisms were selected
according to the technological solution suitable to the legal requirements that were obtained by means
of the counsel requested to consultancy companies regarded as leaders of legislative cases involving
Internet usage. In this process we have found a significant amount of issues. Several of them have
been enumerated as follows:
1. Consultancy costs are high, both in economic and time-to-market terms.
2. In some cases, costs associated to security made the product or the service unviable, resulting in
the cancellation of the service after significant resource expenses, or the redesign of the service,
thus increasing the related costs.
3. Concern was manifested by the companies consulted with regards to the associated cost of
claims, complaints, sanctions and corporative image deterioration that suppose the impacts tied
to security and privacy flaws.
4. Both companies pointed out the convenience of having a simulator to test new ideas for products
and services that could provide them with a forecast of the requirements for security and data
protection in order to perform a cost evaluation prior to the start of the development phase.
5. Heterogeneity of legislative frameworks in the different countries those companies operate in is
a major issue for them.
6. This heterogeneous legislative framework also affects the same countries or even the same
service, depending on how it is used [5,6]. This also happens when one product is designed
as a combination of some others, when the same terminal is used to offer several services, etc.
7. Actions to be taken in a context of likely legislative changes, or when dealing with emergency
level changes that may imply different features related to security and privacy.
8. Previous knowledge of the impact that a specific legislative change will have (in terms of
security and data protection on the IoT-based products and services already deployed) is prone
to be helpful for the agents involved in legislation.
9. The user tends to recklessly offer his/her trust less often. What he/she really requests is be
guaranteed that their information, intimacy, security and safety will not be jeopardized by the
mere fact of voluntarily using (or refusing to use) these new products and services.
After several months of study and consultations to the members of the “Internet Society” related
to the legal area of knowledge, political parties, trade unions, etc., the idea of having these three
areas of knowledge cooperating (business, law and technology) with each other started to build
up. This concept of channelling the requirements of security and privacy through a collaborative
system among the areas of business, law and technology is an original contribution the authors of this
manuscript (this idea has been contrasted and validated by the interlocutors previously mentioned).
This collaboration materializes itself in the collection of the entrepreneurial, legislative and
technological knowledge that can be used by an expert system to provide an answer for the already
mentioned main challenges.
We couldn´t find any system or integrated packet that would adapt to the automation that we
were looking for. The closest were the “Legal Expert Systems”, even though analysis and legislative
conflicts were their focus. The expert system proposed in this paper was inspired basically on
Cuadrado Gamarra´s book about expert systems in the legal field [7], and the articles of Stevens [8]
and Venkateswarlu [9] as well as related references in these about “Legal Expert Systems”. Within
our paper the vision is a bit different; we do not try to solve legislative conflicts as is the case of the
previously mentioned works [7–9], but rather what we want is to obtain the key legislative knowledge
needed in a matter of security and privacy to be able to apply the needed legal imperatives, about a
concrete IoT service.
On the other hand and due to the large researcher activity about it, a lot of investigation studies
are available (among them the major part of the bibliography in the previous publications [5,6]
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mentioned before in this paper) providing mechanisms and technological countermeasures to act
against the threats and attacks to the security and privacy being able to provide solutions.
Therefore, knowing the details of the IoT service that is to be developed, the legal imperatives
that must be applied and a group of available technological solutions, it should be possible to manage
a solution tailored for each situation. This is the purpose of the proposed expert system.
The structure of the system relies on not hindering the independent evolution of each of the
spheres, each of them with its own budget capabilities, Information Technologies systems and their
own route map for their own progress. The only adaptations that must be done are involving data
communication, transfer and results storage; all the other actions can be performed in each of the
spheres with their regular means of work.
This paper proposes an expert system to generate security and privacy policies for services in
the smart city. This policy is communicated to the ACCUS platform, which is able to deploy it to the
network and devices. The expert system proposed in this research has gone though various major
versions since its first design. The first version was presented at the “Third Intech Conference in
London, 2013” [5]. The first version was designed to decide the security level that is needed for a
certain use case for a specific service. It managed the behavior for different use cases using the same
WSN dedicated to health monitoring, but subjected to different legal frameworks. In that case the
expert system provided its security and privacy policies to a service platform called AWARE which
was then able to configure the WSN remotely.
The second version was designed in 2014, when its functionalities were expanded and the
model was modified to be able to work with more than one WSN in different technologies or IoT
services [6]. Thus, the expert system was improved to be able to manage the requirements of various
services, taking into account the possibilities of different technologies. At the same time, the platform
mentioned before was boosted to be able to communicate and configure the security mechanisms for
various WSN technologies.
Lastly, this paper wishes to further expand the model of the expert system to be capable of
selecting the different security and privacy levels for each one of the services in a smart city. Each
newly generated services and created by combination of the existing ones must have a security
level adequate, maybe can be different than the ones being used. It also offers the possibility of
changing the security level in a city, depending on the possible states of alarm or emergency. In
this environment, the mediating platform for the city’s services is ACCUS [4]. This research paper
provides a way to tackle the issues and challenges with regards to security and privacy in the
Internet of Things within the framework of a smart city. These challenges have a major impact in
the entrepreneurial, legislative and technological environments, and while each of them offers only
one part of the solution, the final solution must come from the collaboration among all three areas.
Another important issue is that flaws in security and privacy may affect people´s rights.
This paper does not propose any legislation framework and no security mechanism, but rather it
describes a method to choose and apply the security services based on the collaborative environment
among the business, legal and technological areas.
3. Smart Cities Applications and Urban Systems Management Using ICP
3.1. Smart City Applications
Smart city applications are grouped into several areas. One classification is proposed in [10],
based on the presence of six characteristics shown in Table 1. All these areas raise new challenges in
security and privacy such as transnational authentication systems for citizens and businesses, agreed
frameworks for data privacy, and the sharing and collection of individual and business data, in order
to make a more livable city for citizens, the performance of integrated services and urban systems
(such as manager of the traffic, energy, lighting, emergency systems, or information systems) must
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be taken into account. This enables integrated management strengthened through mutual aid in
situations that require it.
Table 1. Smart City applications.
Applications Target
Smart Economy Innovative spirit; Entrepreneurship; Economic image/trademarks;Productivity; Flexibility of labor market; International embeddedness.
Smart People
Level of qualification; Affinity to lifelong learning; Social and ethnic
plurality; Flexibility; Creativity; Cosmopolitanism/Open-mindedness;
Participation in public life.
Smart Governance Participation in decision-making; Public and social services;Transparent governance; Political strategies/perspectives
Smart Mobility Local accessibility; Accessibility; Availability of ICT-infrastructure;Sustainable, innovative and safe transport systems
Smart Environment Natural conditions; Pollution; Environmental protection; Sustainableresource management
Smart Living Cultural facilities; Health conditions; Individual safety; Housingquality; Education facilities; Social cohesion
For example, correct traffic management in emergency situations can contribute to emergency
services arriving in the shortest possible time wherever they are required, and could also reinforce or
restrict other resources in the same area, etc. To obtain this range of new applications, it is necessary
to integrate both the performance and control of these autonomous systems. It should be noted that
the systems providing specific services must continue to evolve independently and their integration
with other systems must not impede their natural path of evolution, but must find a way that does
not affect their integration with others, in a scenario of an integration of “systems of systems”. Each
system has its own internal evolution, which must not be affected by the integration process, so an
integration platform that enables the possibility for each platform to maintain its functionality and
control would be necessary, and to obtain with the integration the additional advantage of having
enough capacity to enable the generation of new applications.
3.2. ACCUS Project
The proposal in this paper has been deployed inside the European ACCUS project, but the
proposed expert system is in fact adaptable to any other platform that can control, send and receive
commands and responses to/from network elements and perform the needed remote configurations.
As indicated in [4] the ACCUS project focuses on four innovations that are listed below:
‚ Provide an integration and coordination platform for urban systems to build new applications
across urban systems.
‚ Provide adaptive and cooperative control architectures and the corresponding algorithms for
urban subsystems in order to optimize their combined performance.
‚ Provide general methodologies and tools for creating real-time collaborative applications for
“systems of systems”.
‚ Seamless connectivity and semantic interoperability among all services and subsystems
connected. ACCUS ICP must provide the necessary mechanisms and facilities so that present
and future applications and services connected within the smart city can consult which other
subsystems and services exist and what is their functionality.
Currently, the platform has two types of components: (1) core components: the components
which allow the platform to provide its basic functionality such as registration, discovery, control
elements, security, etc. and (2) city customization components: in order to enable the adaptation of
the ICP platform to any city, it must have some plugins that allow this customization, e.g., event
detection, location detection, data analytics, situation awareness . . . A main functionality of the ICP
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platform is to provide the registration and discovery of the provided services by the subsystems.
Figure 1 shows the basic outline of registration and discovery of the subsystems and services. In each
record, the subsystems or services must be recorded semantically according to the platform semantics.
In case the semantics of the service does not match, the adapter subsystem must perform the semantic
conversions needed.
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The components are connected to a service bus to exchange the messages that allow them to
interoperate. The functionality of each component of ICP is:
‚ Service bus: provides the interconnection and cooperation of the component based on a
paradigm of message exchange. It could be implemented using already existing products such as
JBOSS [11] or WSO2 [12].
‚ Subsystem and service discovery: discovers all subsystems connected to the ICP and the services
provided by each subsystem. This component works in real time. It is responsible for registering
subsystems in the semantic repository.
‚ Ontology connector: handles the translations of the data which must be added to the Semantic
Repository, when these data are in a known XML format [13,14]. These translations from XMLs to
RDFs are done using a previously generated mapping file, which describes, what elements/data
from the source XML, must be stored as instances of classes of the ACCUS Ontology. A mapping
file must be defined per each type of XML
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‚ Semantic Service and Subsystem Repository: stores the semantic description, in a way that
complies with the proper ontology of services and subsystems registered in the ICP. When a new
subsystem or service is discovered their semantic description must be stored in this component.
Currently, ACCUS’s architecture is in the development and demonstration phase. However,
it has been evolved from an architecture developed and tested in the e-Gotham project [15] as it is
shown in [16]. Thus, the architecture presented here has been partially developed and tested. A new
service is registered via the following procedure as shown in Figure 2a:
(1) A request is sent to register a new service. The service previously has connected to ESB. It could
be REST service, Web service or any of supported by the ESB.
(2) The request is validated against an XMLSchema so as to check whether there is any issue with
the request. If the request in sot valid, will be rejected.
(3) A template can be filled with the mandatory information in XML format (semantic or
non-semantic format). Of a set of templates, the most appropriate will be chosen.
(4) An XML file is sent to the Ontology Connector (Figure 2b) via OSGi interfaces.
(5) A Logical Service is created in real-time based on an Archetype. This is a key functionality since
it allow to have a registrable version of the physical service.
(6) Logical service registry is acknowledged.
(7) The status of the registry can be requested via the ontology connector (Figure 2b); semantic,
rdf-based responses will be obtained. To do this we use Jena API in order to build a java version
of the ontology, and execute the set of parser on the ontology, let, in this way, ho manage a
semantic repository in RDF.
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In Figure 3 the sequence diagram that specifies the registration process of a service is shown.
When applications need to know the services to be used or included, a query must be sent to the
Semantic Service and Subsystem Repository. The response to this query will be a set of XML files
with the profile of the services available at a given moment.
Since the goal of the platform is to generate semantic interoperability for seamless connectivity,
all the agents listed must be semantically annotated in the same way, so that a service or application
can request a specific query to the Semantic Service and Subsystem Repository, and then get a reply
that complies with known semantics, in this case, the ACCUS ontology. This ontology integrates the
meaning of all the components of the ACCUS platform (core and city customization), the sensors
and actuators, (e.g., SSN) [17], people (e.g., FOAF) [18], city model (e.g., cityGML) [19], services
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and subsystems in the city (for the smart grid subsystem, an ad-hoc ontology was developed in the
e-Gotham project [16]).
The subsystems and services may be semantically annotated according to the ACCUS ontology,
their own, or none whatsoever, but the ACCUS ICP must provide, as a response to the queries
received, results in accordance with the ACCUS ontology. To do so, the Ontology Connector
component performs the necessary transformations so that the registry in the Semantic Service and
Subsystem Repository complies with the ACCUS ontology, as seen in Figure 3.Sensors 2016, 16, 0016 
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Figure 3. Registration of a service in ACCUS.
The legacy application or service does not have to know the ACCUS ontology, it will send the
query with its own annotation format [S[XML]] (previously known by Ontology Connector) and with
its own protocol. If necessary, a transformation protocol will be done in the Subsystem Adaptor in
order to provide to the Ontology Connector the request of the legacy application or service in the
field set in the communication protocol between Subsystem Adaptor and Ontology Connector. Once
received the request in the original formal, it will execute the suitable transformation to ACCUS
ontology syntax [A[XML]]. In this way, registration ill occur in the Semantic Database. The response
it will be sent to the Ontology Connector, which if necessary will transform it from ACCUS ontology
syntax to Legacy Application or service syntax and Subsystem Adaptor will do the appropriate
protocol transformation changes and it will be sent to the originator of the request. An example
of a registration for a smart home, consisting of enhanced tele-assistance at home, can be depicted
as follows:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<service>
<profile>
<serviceIdentif cation>
EN_TEL_ASSIST_1
</serviceIdentification>
<functionality>
<preconditionDescription>
service on
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</preconditionDescription>
<outputDescription>
Celsius degrees float
</outputDescription>
<outputDescription>
CO2 level integer
</outputDescription>
<outputDescription>
Smoke presence binary
</outputDescription>
</functionality>
<security>
<policy>basic security policy</policy>
<dataProtection>integrity</dataProtection>
<dataProtection>autehentication</dataProtection>
</security>
<grounding>
<inputMessage>
start
</inputMessage>
<outputMessage>
sensorID-lenghtMessage-PreviousValue-CurrentValue
</outputMessage>
<endPoint>
/icp/assist/home1
</endPoint>
</grounding>
</profile>
<process>
<processID> </processID>
<typeOfProcess>
<atomicProcess/>
</typeOfProcess>
<operations>
<operation id="read">
<preconditions>
device on service on
</preconditions>
<insANDouts>
<output>float</output>
<output>integer</output>
<output>binary</output>
</insANDouts>
</operation>
</operations>
</process>
<context>
<serviceType>
Sensors 2016, 16, 16 10 of 38
<loction> indoor</loction>
<motion>static</motion>
</serviceType>
<geoCoordinates>
<longitude> 40.33889</longitude>
<latitude>3.628611</latitude>
</geoCoordinates>
<smartSpace> smart Home 1</smartSpace>
</context>
</service>
But, what is the real utility of ontology in this process? Since the main purpose of ontology is
to represent in a standard way the meaning of contents with the goal of inferring new knowledge,
semantic interoperability allows access to everything registered within the ACCUS ICP, in accordance
with the ACCUS ontology. This approach enables a new service or application to send a query to
the Semantic Service and Subsystem Repository in SPARQL [20], and obtain as a result information
about other subsystems, services; components or devices are connected within the Smart City, their
function, and form of access. Since this is a repository in RDF [21], an appropriate response will be
sent back to the agent that performed the query. The discovery process of the registered services is
shown in the next sequence diagram (Figure 4).
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registered for selecting the more suitable one, it will generate a query that may be 
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 ?service ns:hasProfile ?profile. 
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PREFIX ns:<http://www.semanticweb.org/ACCUS/1.1#>
SELECT ?ServiceIdentification ?inputDescription ?outputDescription ?policy ?data
Protection ?endPoint
WHERE {
?service ns:hasProfile ?profile.
?profile ns:hasServiceIdentification ?serviceIdentification.
?profile ns:hasFunctionality ?functionality.
?profile ns:hasSecurity ?security.
?profile ns:hasGrounding ?grounding.
?functionality ns:hasInputDescription ?inputDescription.
?functionality ns:hasOutputDescription ?outputDescription.
?security ns:hasPolicy ?ns:policy.
?security ns:hasDataProtection ?dataProtection.
?grounding ns:hasEndPoinf ?endPoint.
}
Response will be in an XML-formatted message according to the ontology:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<services>
<service>
<profile>
<serviceIdentification>
EN_TEL_ASSIST_1
</serviceIdentification>
<functionality>
<preconditionDescription>
service on
</preconditionDescription>
<outputDescription>
Celsius degrees float
</outputDescription>
<outputDescription>
CO2 level integer
</outputDescription>
<outputDescription>
Smoke Presence binary
</outputDescription>
</functionality>
<security>
<policy>basic security policy</policy>
<dataProtection>integrity</dataProtection>
</security>
<grounding>
<endPoint>
/icp/assist/home1
</endPoint>
</grounding>
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</profile>
</service>
<service>.....</service>
<service>.....</service>
</services>
With the information therein it will be capable of inferring new knowledge that, in the context
of a smart city, consists of generating new cross-domain applications and services for the city
and citizens, which then must also be registered in the ACCUS ICP, producing constant feedback.
Furthermore, these new applications will already use the ACCUS ontology.
3.3. Security and Privacy in a Smart City
Studies performed some years ago such as [22] recognized the importance of data privacy
and personal identity among the aspects to be dealt with, not only on technical grounds, but also
concerning legal frameworks:
E-Government: There are a number of technologies that will be required for the underlying
infrastructure that is needed to help support this process. Fundamental technologies are key to
the development of the Digital Single Market (such as authentication and privacy), and to the
development of e-government in smart cities. The development of transnational authentication
systems for citizens and businesses, the development of agreed frameworks for data privacy, and
the sharing and collection of individual and business data, must be considered.
Health, Inclusion and Assisted Living: The key technical requirements to be addressed in this
domain are: security (encryption, authentication and authorization), service discovery, scalability
and survivability, persistence, interworking, community-to-community application messaging
propagation, auditing and logging, location information sharing, and application service migration.
The challenge related to ICT security aspects has to be ensured by a manageable access control
management system, to ensure that only authorized persons are allowed to access the data, and
ensures that the data is protected to achieve confidentiality. Users should manage authorization.
Dedicated authentication and logging mechanisms have to support the enforcement of access control.
The challenge in this approach is that access control architecture has to enable both the decentralized
storage of data, and the comprehensive access control mechanisms and enforcement that concern all
parties that could have access to that data.
Intelligent Transportation Systems: the provisioning of flexible, scalable and self-optimized networks,
dealing with heterogeneity, effectively exploiting location information, guaranteeing real-time
exchange of data where needed, and providing security, privacy and authentication mechanisms.
Smart Grids, Energy Efficiency, and the Environment: Other challenges include: new
communication and networking ICT technologies, new affordable devices that gather environment
data, new intelligent algorithms for smart ubiquitous environments, new light sources, new and
fair regulations that enables the mass implementation of the Intelligent Street Lighting System idea
provided by different vendors; new products for global markets that enable steady economic growth;
and advanced products and services based on IP to foster innovations, and economic growth based
on an open innovation scheme. Recently, Sicari et al. presented in [23] a vision of the near future
in security, privacy and trust in IoT. Finally, Weber et al. presented in [24] the forthcoming issues in
privacy applied to IoT.
4. Challenges on Privacy and Trust
It is important to know how to classify data sources in a smart city and their relation to personal
identity. These sources are the following:
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‚ Non personal sources: data, unrelated to specific people, gathered from devices (temperature or
humidity sensors, etc.)
‚ Personal sources: data, related to specific people, gathered from devices, unambiguously using
user identity (social networks, etc.)
‚ Anonymous sources: data related to specific people gathered from devices, but which have been
pre-processed to mask their personal identity (covering faces in video camera images, etc.).
It may be possible to discover user information by processing data from several sources. These
situations must be considered. From a technological viewpoint the security and privacy problems
can be grouped as follows: (1) Problems related to computer security and communication systems;
(2) Problems related to database security, user identities and communications; (3) Problems occurring
when new subsystems are added to the smart city (increasing its complexity and vulnerabilities).
4.1. Problems Related to Computer Security and Communication Systems
These are the problems such as malware (viruses, trojans, worms, backdoors, spyware, etc.), or
bots, loggers, rootkits, DDoS attacks, lack of updates [25,26], etc. They are prevented by installing
suitable antivirus, firewalls, honeypots, intrusion detection systems (IDS), security policies, updating
and implementing system authentication measures. When the devices are localized all around the
city and do not have a common control platform, updating or implementing the new policies of
authentication or refusing the authorizations is difficult.
4.2. Problems Related to Database Security, User Identities and Communications
‚ Database security [27] The Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) techniques consist of inserting
noise or aggregations to maintain privacy, while maintaining the significant value of the data.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) techniques are based on queries asking for more than the
necessary information in order to hide the specific information demanded by the user.
‚ To hide user identities accessing location-based services (LBS) techniques are used such as
cloaking and using pseudonyms.
‚ Privacy in communications, advanced cryptography and access control can be used to prevent
eavesdropping on the data and prevent unauthorized connection nodes to the networks with
distributed devices in access public places [28].
4.3. Problems Occurring When New Subsystems Are Added to the Smart City
When new subsystems are added to the smart city the complexity and the number of
vulnerabilities grow [28], which can be exploited by malicious people to harm the most vulnerable
systems and enter into the other subsystems of the smart city.
‚ Increased interconnections among services increase the ways through which a virus can
propagate. Hackers can move through the interconnections among the systems and take control.
‚ Dependencies among infrastructures. A failure in one of the nodes in the dependencies network
could cause some cascade problems. Planning and management can alleviate the problem [29].
‚ The connection of the smart city with the other platforms and applications by middleware is a
strategic element. Those connections must be secured, implementing confidentiality, integrity
and authenticity and they must also be interoperable.
‚ The fact that having a great quantity of services and data sources facilitates creating new
applications and services, but risks the availability of these services if a fault in any of them
occurs, which would cause malfunctions an application and even make it unusable.
‚ In an open data context with a great quantity of information sources (both real-time and
historical), publishing new data makes it difficult to ensure that they cannot be used to infer
the identity of users (using correlation techniques,...). To minimize the time of intrusions and
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attacks, solutions that implement active reactions in a crisis scenario to curb the anomaly [30]
are used.
If users believe that a system is insecure or threatening to their privacy, it will not be able to
establish itself successfully in the market. Thus, in order to achieve user consent, trust in, and
acceptance of smart cities, the integration of security and privacy-preserving mechanisms must be
a key concern of future research. New challenges arise in the area of security and privacy, and they
can be classified as follows:
Interconnecting systems that serve completely different purposes (traffic control and energy
management for example), and thereby create a “system of systems”, increase the complexity of
such collaborating systems exponentially. As a result, the number of vulnerabilities in a smart
city system will be significantly higher than that of each of its sub-systems. Furthermore, the
pure interconnection of two systems might open new attack vectors that have not been considered
before, when securing either of the individual systems. Therefore, research into ways of handling
the increasing complexity of distributed systems from the security perspective is required, which
includes: cost-effective and tamper resistant smart systems or device architectures (crypto and key
management for platforms with limited memory and computation); evolutionary trust models for
scalable and secure inter-system interaction; comprehensive security policy; self-monitoring and
self-protecting systems, as well as development of methods for designing security and privacy into
complex and interdependent systems.
The number of users, and the volume and quality of collected data, will also increase with
the development of smart cities. When personal data is collected by smart meters, smart phones,
smart vehicles, and other types of ubiquitous sensors, privacy becomes all the more important.
The challenge is, on the one hand, in the area of identity and privacy management, where, for
instance, pseudonymisation must be applied throughout the whole system, in order to separate the
data collected about a user from the user’s real identity. On the other hand, security technologies
such as advanced encryption, access control, and intelligent data aggregation techniques, must be
integrated into all systems in order to reduce the amount of personal data as much as possible,
without limiting the quality of service. It is necessary to work towards interoperability of different
identity management systems, as well as automatic consideration of user’s preferences. It is necessary
to develop also privacy mechanisms which allow users to express their preferences on service quality
and data minimization.
4.4. The Challenges
All services in the smart city give rise to new security and privacy challenges and although it is
not the main selling issue, users implicitly expect that the involved systems are secure and the privacy
of users are kept. A successful attack will directly impact the life of people. Thus, if the users deem
that the system is not secure or that it threatens their privacy or their rights, they will refuse to use
IoT services, and the solution will not be able to be successfully placed in the market. From the user´s
point of view, the requirement is to guarantee the protection of their privacy rights. In consequence,
protecting the services of smart cities is a primary issue. So, in order to achieve user consent, and
acceptance of smart cities, integration of security and privacy-preserving mechanisms must be a key
concern of future research. The challenges can be several aspects:
‚ Handling of the increasing complexity of distributed systems from the security perspective
such as the identity and privacy management such as pseudonymisation throughout the whole
system, in order to separate the data about a user from its real identity.
‚ Integration of security technologies into systems such as advanced encryption and access control,
and intelligent data aggregation techniques, etc.
‚ The context of smart cities relates to open data business models. It is possible because services
become pervasive and ubiquitous and the opening of the databases will become more important.
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The most important issue has to be transparency, so the end-user must be know how his/her
information is being used, with clear options and secured environments, when providing services
that use personal data.
5. Implementation of the Solution in the ACCUS Project Environment
The holistic service in a smart city comprises several components to provide a particular service
(smart grid, smart traffic, etc.). Each service must have its own security mechanisms to protect
itself and the personal data therein. Each particular service has its own security, but the whole
service (the joint service) for throughout the city must be considered, since some security holes may
exist caused for interactions among those. The whole service in the city from a holistic viewpoint
could be handled with some additional security techniques. The joint service in the city as the
superposition of individual services is shown in Figure 5. It shows some smart services with a
real infrastructure (sensor nodes, communication paths, base station, etc.) defined as a Real Smart
Service (RSS), coexisting with other services comprised of combining and processing the information
available, defined as Virtual Smart Services (VSS) [31–33]. In this environment the components to
protect are sensor nodes, communication paths, base station, and sensible data that flow through
them in the RSS. Aggregation and information processing must be protected by security mechanism
in both RSS and VSS.Sensors 2016, 16, 0016 
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and data protection laws. There are some services of IoT such as smart grids for which the legal 
analysis has already been performed in a DPIA template, but other IoT services have not got them 
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5.2. Constructing Security and Privacy Policies 
As we can see, Figure 6 gives an overview of the selection chain of security mechanisms that 
constitute a security and privacy policy. To make it, a DPIA template is needed, and as a result, the 
security services are mapped by security imperatives based on the concept. Security services are 
bound by legal and regulatory frameworks. To comply with them, a DPIA template is very useful. 
Each network type has its own mechanisms and countermeasures, depending on its technology and 
its limitations (battery, memory, process capacity, etc.). A service in the same city made up of 
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5.1. Data Protection Impact Assessment
It is important to note that each particular service is analyzed by a Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) Template [34]. As a result some security holes may appear; therefore making a
new DPIA Template for the holistic service could be the solution to fill these holes. A new particular
service in a smart city has an effect on itself and on the holistic service, and thus the DPIA is the main
tool for continuously reviewing the security mechanisms and countermeasures to satisfy the security
and data protection laws. There are some services of IoT such as smart grids for which the legal
analysis has already been performed in a DPIA template, but other IoT services have not got them yet.
In those cases it must be made by the general method given in [34]. At the end DPIA-T must obtain
the Feared events; Threat ID; Related Security & Privacy targets; Affected assets; Impact; Likelihood;
Risk Level, that is, the security and privacy imperatives for the entities that must be protected.
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5.2. Constructing Security and Privacy Policies
As we can see, Figure 6 gives an overvie of the selection chain of security mechanisms that
constitute a security and privacy policy. T it, I template is ne ded, and as a result, the
security services are ma ped by sec tives based on the concept. Security services are
bound by legal and regulatory fra e T ith them, a DPIA template is very useful.
Each network type has its own mechanis s easures, depending on its technol gy and
its limitations (batt r , memory, process capacity, etc.). A service in th same city ade up of different
technologies may have different mechanisms to address counterattacks on the same security service
(possibly with different results). One DPIA template over the holistic service can give supplementary
mechanisms sufficient protection. As result of this process some mechanisms and countermeasures
could be modified or adjusted.
5.3. Automatic Selection System for Making Decisions over Security and Privacy Policies
To advance the state of the art, at first the relevant, available and accessible knowledge in the
information resources about security and privacy is analyzed. Useful knowledge flows are singled
out, such as researching reports, etc., and what can be done with this knowledge is analyzed. Today
there are many studies in highly targeted areas; in fact, in the technical area, there are many studies
dedicated to developing new efficient security mechanisms, in order to provide specific solutions to
specific cases. In the legal area, the legal implications of this new paradigm are being investigated
and some ideas and projects are being developed in this regard. Moreover, companies and suppliers
of equipment and networks are also devising services useful to society.
5.3.1. Overview
The basic idea of the expert system developed focuses on gathering all this knowledge generated
by experts and formalizing it into knowledge bases, making it appropriate for it to be processed to
obtain security policies to be applied to products and real services. This idea is developed in [6] and
it is represented in Figure 7.
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The knowledge generated by the human experts from the areas involved is stored in order to be
processed. Data protection measures are selected based on this information network, so the inclusion
of these knowledge areas allows for example, to certify to users and corporations that this IoT service
is adequately protected.
There are three knowledge bases which are the most important part of the expert system.
They contain the results of the collaborative work of the involved areas. These areas are the
Business-Business Expert System (BES) about the service definition; Juridical—Legal Expert System
(LES) about the Law framework; and the Technological area– Technological Selection Expert System
(TSES) about attacks, security services, and mechanisms. The information flow is shown in Figure 8.
In the environment of a smart city it could be very advantageous to concentrate on a Network
Operation Centre (NOC), the intelligence, maintenance and deployment of actions related to security
and privacy policies in the smart city. This way, all this knowledge generated by the different areas
can be leveraged, and made available in an information system to act as a support of collaborative
work between the areas involved, in order to find the best solutions for the protection of personal
data generated in each case.
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Figure 9. Working network.
This would allow the issuing of certificates to provide enough confidence for users and
businesses. NOC and ICP work together. In an environment like that, companies that want to
design new products and services can use the expert system to perform virtual simulations before
making decisions over on the actual markets. The legal and political sectors could conduct impact
assessments on society and the market about possible changes and new laws on data protection,
being able to know how and to what extent existing products and services and future developments
would be affected. It would also be useful for the technological sector. It could observe and
assess critical aspects that need new research and innovation, or emerging issues that require
technological solutions.
The current state of this development performs automatic selection which takes into account
the various factors that determine the need for specific services and security mechanisms. These
factors include legal and regulatory requirements for personal data protection of the product or
service to be provided, its network topology, its physical characteristics, etc. All these elements
should be considered for a robust implementation of a security system that is able to adapt to each
particular case. With these elements, among others mentioned in [35], services and appropriate
security mechanisms are chosen to be implemented in the design and construction of the product
or service, by a decision based on certain security requirements, which must act over a set of data that
must be protected by legal and regulatory requirements.
When a new service is implemented within the city, or when certain laws have been changed, it
might be necessary to implement a new security and privacy policy, or to adapt the exiting one. The
expert system described herein decides which policy must be applied in the smart city. Following that,
every system and network element involved and distributed within the city must be reconfigured. If
these actions are to be performed automatically, ACCUS must act as a mediator, that is, it must be
able to translate the new security and privacy policy, received from the expert system, and it needs
to generate the necessary commands and actions, adapted to the requirements of each technology of
the smart city. This way, suitable mechanisms will be activated according to the security and privacy
policy that each service needs to fulfill. This task of configuring and reconfiguring the security and
privacy policy of the smart city is accomplished by using the chain of mediation shown in Figure 10.
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Respecting the knowledge network in the expert system, a general overview will be given in
Figure 12 and is discussed in the next subsections, where the knowledge network in the system
is described.
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5.3.2. Business Expert System (BES)
As shown in Figure 12, the BES knowledge is composed of the service type information, the data
sets that could be sensitive (BES is not sure yet if those data sets must be protected or not), and finally
by the characteristics of the type of used network for this service or IoT.
The service type information is stored in the “Utility Matrix” and is composed by two parts.
The first one is composed of the information of interest for the processing of legislation in the LES,
that is, the necessary data to select the legislative framework for the IoT service. It is composed by
information such as the type of service, the type of operating environment, and the country where it
is located. It also has the Information about the promoters, users and monitored entities (if they are
people, their capacity and special needs are also known). The data that is considered as sensitive are
also included.
The requirements of the service, as well as the necessity of its continuity, its own criticality,
and the type of network that will provide it are also included. This is precisely the part that
complements the utility matrix; it is the technical information about the type of network that is
relevant when selecting among the security mechanisms in the TSES. The structure of the service,
its own safeguards and bug handling, the possibility of operating the nodes as standalone, signaling
and synchronization, monitoring interval, network segments, transmission sharing, information
aggregation and routing are also stored.
5.3.3. Legal Expert System (LES)
As shown in Figure 12, the LES knowledge is composed by the information about the legal
imperatives to protect the data considered as sensitive by the legal framework. LES receives data
from BES to compose the DPIA-T if does not exist yet.
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As the LES processes information, data sets are put together, grouping personal and other
sensitive data handled by the IoT service. A specific normative is applied to these data sets, assigning
legal constraints or a necessary level of protection for a certain service type.
The service type is a function of the environment, country, promoters, users and monitored
entities and their relevant legal characteristics. Actually, this information framing is coherent with
the legal analysis that the NIST as well as the European Union carry out in their DPIA-T impact
assessment templates.
If there is a set, {si}, of services that possess infrastructures, and there is a set, {sj}, of joint services
composed by subsets of {si}, then there will be (i + j) impact assessment templates. It may also be
the case that new services can be generated from elements of {sj}, by themselves or by combining
with other elements of {si}. In conclusion, the simplest approach is to have an impact assessment for
each individual service, and one for each joint service, adapting the necessary mechanisms to each
service. That way, services with an associated infrastructure are not hindered in regards to resources,
achieving a tailored security. All data processing in LES is compatible with the “Data Protection Risk
Assessment (DPIA)”.
5.3.4. Technological Selection Expert System (TSES)
As shown in Figure 12, the TSES knowledge is composed by the security service information, and
the information about the attacks, mechanism & countermeasures. The TSES processes information
by mapping the imperatives in security services that need to be applied to data sets. These security
services for a certain network type (resources, connectivity, communications, resources in the base
station, topology, nodes, routing, signaling, and synchronism) are threatened by a list of attacks that
affect the IoT service. These attacks have countermeasures (security service, network type, attacks,
mechanism & countermeasure).
Luckily, nowadays there are already securities and privacy mechanisms that make it possible
to use complex cryptographic mechanisms, supported by the rapidly advancing development of the
hardware and operating systems of network elements. Currently, it is possible to cover the majority of
cases routinely presented, and luckily there is a lot of activity focused in the creation of new solutions.
For the purpose of this paper, the security and privacy policy is considered as the set of
mechanisms integrated within the services. The security policies and mechanisms’ suitability analysis
is selected by the degree of coverage reached while having sufficient mechanisms, and by determining
the best ones for the resources of the technology to which they are applied (delay, consumption,
etc.). If not enough mechanisms are found, a coverage alarm would be set off in the corresponding
knowledge base, urging the corresponding experts to solve the issue.
Attacks can be done by both outsider and insider attackers. Insiders, however, are able
to perform worst damaging actions since they used to have a higher level of permissions and
system knowledge.
If an overview of insider attacks is done, it can be noticed that, for instance, SCADA systems
are used in many critical infrastructure applications that have important software components,
such as Human Machine Interfaces, servers with historical data, Remote Terminal Units and the
communication links between them. The latter include the units used to collect information and
transfer it back to the central site carrying out any necessary analysis and control, and displaying that
information on an operator screen afterwards. The operators use the Human Machine Interfaces
data to make supervisory decisions. Therefore, the Human Machine Interfaces, data historians,
communication links, sensors threshold values and actuator normal settings [36,37] can be attacked
by an outsider (the attack can be initiated from outside, by unauthorized or illegitimate users; those
usually are opportunistic, deliberate, and malicious) or by insider attackers (they happen when an
authorized user misuses the permissions and damages the system by sending legitimate control
commands with a great impact and higher success rate; these are difficult to predict and provide
protection against them). With regards to users, not only engineers (responsible for managing
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object libraries and user interfaces, setting grid topology, normal work condition states, setting
parameters of devices, defining process set points, writing automation scripts, etc.) have to be
considered in a secure deployment, but also operators (expected to monitor the system status in
Human Machine Interfaces servers, react to alarms and some events so that the process will run
correctly, execute operator commands that often prevent triggering new alarms, resolve incoming
alarms, make decisions about changing topology, etc.). An engineer is a more powerful system user
than an operator, but the transmission system is controlled by operators. Insider attacks [36,37] to be
considered are:
- Unresolved alarms attacks, when alarms are not perfectly resolved (delaying or making
incorrect or incomplete actuations). These situations can provoke cascading failures of major
consequences if a critical security error is unnoticed. Malfunctions sometimes are a consequence
of wrong, high-level management decisions, such as budget cuts, transforming the activity
of human operators from one of specialized nature to a multifunctional one without enough
training, etc.
- Misconfiguration attacks of differing nature: Overload attacks (wrong changes of topology and
load transfers, which can cause overload or a power failure in a large area), Outage attacks
(opening the output feeders), incorrect setting attacks (improper equipment settings which
could cause equipment incorrect operation).
The incident response can be a complicated matter because one minor mistake may result in
the loss of the most critical pieces of evidence and make the whole case inadmissible for a trial or
other court actions. Some mechanisms against insider attacks has been mentioned and referenced
in [36–41], such as:
‚ Detect anomalous behavior in SCADA network traffic.
‚ Detect anomalies based on validating protocol specifications
‚ A real-time anomaly detection system for unknown attacks
‚ Anomaly detection for insider attacks based on system logs of the SCADA system to be
periodically monitored to detect anomalous behavior (it is necessary to control time periods,
parameter values, content of the command orders and many more variables).
‚ Detecting insider attacks in SCADA by data passing through the system and include a semantic
module capable of understanding user actions.
‚ Statistical Anomaly Detection Method (SADM) is developed in some SCADA systems, by
analyzing statistical properties of alarms that will determine the normal system behavior. SADM
uses statistical properties to determine whether “current behavior” deviate significantly from
the “normal behavior” by using the mean and standard deviation parameters in order to set
thresholds, which can be learned from observations (operator behavior).
‚ Reference [42] talk about any malicious behavior changes statistical properties of alarms and is
identified as an anomaly (experimental scenarios have been simulated by the proposed Colored
Petri Nets (CPN)-model for insider attacks).
5.4. Processing Stages
Table 2 shows the basic process of selection and the knowledge bases involved. This operation
mode enables the cooperation between experts from the areas involved through knowledge generated
and formalized.
Simplicity was given a priority after numerous concept tests, so that the expert system is fast and
user friendly. But this is not free, the coverage and reliability of policies and security mechanisms are
transferred to the performance, coverage and reliability of the information in the knowledge bases of
each of the three parts, BES, LES and TSES.
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Table 2. Processing stages.
Information Involved
Input Knowledge Base Output
1. Services requirements Business Knowledge 2. Utility matrix & Personal datainvolved
2. Utility matrix & personal data involved Laws and standards Knowledge 3. Legal Imperatives oversensible information
3. Legal Imperatives over
sensible information
Attacks, security services,
mechanisms Knowledge
4. Security services & mechanisms
over information pieces
4. Security services & mechanisms over
information pieces. Business Knowledge 5. Final decision
5. Final decision Validity check 6. Legal certification
Utility matrix & personal data involved are made in a Business Expert System (BES) based on the
final service requirements and the information managed. The user provides all this information
through forms, in a guided way. The utility matrix is composed of two parts. The first part is
comprised of the information about the type of the final service, about the country, the developers
and users, the entity being monitored (persons, animals or things), the characteristics of the persons
subject to monitoring (children, adults, seniors, their legal capacity, special needs, etc.). With this
information and the data involved in the service (some of them may be personal data) the Legal
Expert System (LES) is able to perform the necessary processing to obtain the legal requirements
that must be implemented in order to protect the information which must be protected. The second
part contains more technical information about the network type, the sensor nodes resources, the
base station and the connection types, the communication used, network topology, type of routing,
signaling, synchronism, if continuity of service is required or not, and the level of service criticality
(critical for people, for infrastructures, etc.). These data are needed by the Technological Selection of
security solutions Expert System (TSES) to determine the possible service vulnerabilities.
The correct selection of security services and mechanisms strongly correlates with the amount
of information available about technology, topology and information extracted from the Utility
Matrix [5,6]. It is clear that not all technologies are able to support all the existing mechanisms
without affecting quality of service. With the current knowledge available about the technological
possibilities, it may be possible to form a synergy between the security services and mechanisms in
order to obtain the minimum processing for the security and privacy required.
Laws and standards Knowledge: The LES knowledge base does not store laws; it stores the
knowledge of experts in their area about the legal requirements to apply to personal data on the
final service. The legal framework is obtained from the extracted information from the Utility Matrix
(service type, country, environment type, if continuous monitoring is needed, or if this is a critical
service or not). From this legal framework legal imperatives are extracted. Legal requirements are
identified by the main concept represented:
‚ Actors’ truthfulness is transformed into “Authenticity”;
‚ Access authorization is transformed into “Access control”;
‚ Disclosure or dissemination of information is transformed into “Privacy”;
‚ Content’s truthfulness is transformed into “Integrity”;
‚ Actors’ responsibility is transformed into “Non-repudiation”;
‚ Availability and continuity of service is transformed into “Availability”.
The data that may need to be protected are those that identify to the people individually and
are related to their gathered data, their processed about historical data, or the complete events that
identify the state or situation of the person, etc.
The conceptual direct relationship is established between the LES legal imperatives obtained
and security services by Recommendation X.800 [43] in TSES. The attacks on the final service are
countered by the security services which comprise countermeasures and security mechanisms. In the
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TSES knowledge base the security services, and the countermeasures and the security mechanisms
are associated with the attacks. The obtained result is a set of mechanisms and countermeasures
to achieve the security level needed. When the system is unable to find a solution for all
requirements of security and privacy, a warning of insufficiency of knowledge is thrown indicating
the problem encountered.
One part of the assigned work to the technological human experts of TSES is to feed the
knowledge database with useful mechanisms that may be utilized. These mechanisms will be
classified according to several features concerning the casuistry where they are successful when
applied, their effectiveness against attacks (based both on a study made for this solution and past
experience), an assessment of easiness of change and adjustment and the capacity of the each
mechanism to be monitored.
The ACCUS platform directly supervises the involved security mechanisms, attack attempts
and the successful attacks, and once the attack has been mitigated, the involved mechanisms will be
revised, and corresponding changes are made in the platform, in the service and in the expert system.
5.5. Performance Evaluation
The expert system is responsible for controlling the level of current legislation fulfilment
regarding asset protection (that is, the level of fulfilment of legal obligations). The smart city offers a
collection of individual services prone to be attacked. Each of the services is subdued to some specific
“legal obligations” that are implemented by means of “countermeasures and security mechanisms”.
“Attacks” may cause an “impact” on the assets that must be protected, so the level of fulfilment
regarding current legislation is assessed on the basis of the impact that has taken place (“0” = no
impact registered, “1” = impact on non-legally protected assets, “2” = impact on legally protected
assets). There are three indicators:
‚ No legislation-based impact attacks: (Service; Attack; Impact (0 U 1)).
‚ Seriousness of the impacts: (Service; Attack; Impact (0, 1, 2)).
‚ Legislation-based impact: (Service; Attack; Impact (2)).
These indicators can be aggregated to the overall service or disaggregated in individual services
from the values: Vn’, k’ (Indicator value for indicator k’, for the service n’). When impact is mentioned,
it is referred to one value k’ P [1, k] depending on the specific service n’ P [1, n] it has been aggregated
to. Value V is the one corresponding to the impact.
Thus, the number of attacks without legal impact, the number of attacks with legal impact, and
a quantitative measure of the seriousness of the occurring impacts can be known. It is also possible
to know which the most attacked services and the attacks that cause greater impact are, and therefore
assess the mechanisms against the attacks.
To find the main causes that lead to unwanted impacts, auxiliary measures must be obtained
to establish an improvement plan. These measures are obtained from the service platforms that
can send them, or logging in periodically and processing this information from their event logs.
These indicators are basically two: (1) Effectiveness of the mechanisms and countermeasures against
security attacks and (2) Overhead introduced by those mechanisms in the system when these
mechanisms are operating and may affect the quality of the service (traffic, delays and excessive
resource consumption), i.e., Overhead caused by defensive actions.
This performance control is executed by the expert system, based on an alarms system which is
described below:
‚ Security system states:
# All Seem Well (ASW), no alarm condition.
# Alarm categorized as “Minor alarm”, “Major alarm” or “Critical alarm”.
# An “Alarm Ceasing” condition appears when the alarm condition disappears.
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‚ There is an alarm increasement-related category policy because of alarm accumulation and the
usage of an alarm decreasement category policy if there is no alarm repetition in a certain
time interval.
‚ When there is not any alarm the text ASW appears, and the Minor, Major and Critical alarms
text with green background. When alarms appear the Minor background is blue, the Major
background is yellow, and the Critical background is red. If we look at the panel and on the alarm
background the number of detected alarms in each category appear highlighted. For example,
supposing that in one moment there are 3 “Minor” alarms and 1 “Major” alarm, number “3” is
highlighted on the Minor alarm background and number “1” on the Major alarm background.
All the data of the alarms, their activity, their start and the alarm ceasing, are stored in the
alarmlog. Based on the alarmlog information the statistics about the alarms are established.
This concentration of alarm information gives the possibility of generating higher-level alarms
and proactive alarms. When an alarm is received, is categorized with an alarm level based on the
knowledge base (Vn,k; LAlm). After that, its alarm level (An,k) may change according to the number
of repeats and time interval. Each one of the attacks on a service is associated with a mechanism,
along with the impact. Noting "the time until the alarm ceases", "the associated mechanism" and the
"code of completion of the action" for a mechanism, a general vision is obtained. The expert system
also evaluates the features regarding the properties of the mechanisms which are:
‚ Flexibility: the simplicity (or complexity) degree of change and readjustment regarding security
mechanisms, either due to a change in legislation or an update in the smart city alert level
(pre-emptive actions, natural disasters, etc.) is considered too. if because of one of these reasons
security levels in a smart city have to be modified, the ability of modifying them with ease (even
remotely if possible) will improve the efficiency of the smart city.
‚ Capability of being monitored: this parameter measures the capacity of one security mechanism
to be monitored. Manufacturers may provide tools to supervise the procedures that they have
enabled for their equipment. If this is not the case, they must be developed by human experts
and described in TSES.
‚ There is also knowledge coverage control over the knowledge in the BES, LES and TSES, which
usually gives way to revisions and adjustments of the mechanisms.
All this information is analyzed and then enters the system improvement plan.
As a conclusion of the performance evaluation, the main intangible benefit is to provide fast
answers to new legal risks about personal data protection in the IoT environment, and these answers
are provided by the entity capable of doing so (juridical area) and control the results. Another benefit
is to allow companies to conduct cost studies and test ideas for new products and services before
beginning the development process.
The main tangible benefit is to provide a tailored security and privacy implies that use the
necessaries mechanisms only. It represents as results to obtain savings in resources for sensor nodes.
In some cases these savings avoid to use heterogeneous sensor network, for example. If a promoter
want to provide the same service such as “health monitoring” for different user types (people,
animals, or plants), each one has a different requirements on privacy. These savings can be calculated
by the following expression (Equation (1)):
X¨Y “ Z;
¨˚
˚˝˚ b11 . b1k. . .
. . .
bn1 . bnk
‹˛‹‹‚¨
¨˚
˝ SecService1.
SecServicek
‹˛‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚ SecServices UserType p1q.
.
SecServices UserType pnq
‹˛‹‹‚ (1)
X represents the assign matrix; Y is the matrix that represents the possibilities to provide security
services for one specific technology in the final service, finally Z is the set of services assigned to one
user type.
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Matrix X assign the security services to user type. Each row represents the services for one user
type and the each column enable “1” or disable “0”, the specific security services, so b[nk] is the
enable o disable value for the security service “k” for the user type “n”, SecServices UserType(k) is
the set of security services assigned to the user type(K).
All users have to belong to the defined user types, and each user type has a certain
percentage of users inside. For example, suppose that 25% of users belong to each of the four
groups; SecServices UserType(1): cows; SecServices UserType(2): horses; SecServices UserType(3):
footballers; SecServices UserType(4): firefighters, according with [6], the expression is Equation (2):¨˚
˚˝˚ 0 0 0 01 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
‹˛‹‹‚¨
¨˚
˚˝˚ AuthenticityPrivacy
Integrity
Availability
‹˛‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚ No SecAut` Priv
Aut` Priv` Int
Aut` Priv` Int` Avail
‹˛‹‹‚ (2)
25% of users do not have any security services, and the others save some services. Each service
can be quantified in spent of resources in terms of energy, delay, dollars, etc. Another tangible
benefit is that by concentrating the intelligence in a NOC, not only leads to greater specialization,
the manpower costs are rationalized in a coherent dimension.
6. Application Scenario for a Smart Service Providing Security, Privacy and Trust: “Living at
Home Longer, Autonomously and Safely”
The goal was to develop a service for elderly people named “Living at home longer,
autonomously and safely“. This service is composed of one service called “Enhanced tele-assistance
at home” and another one called “Safe home”. The next paragraphs describe the security and privacy
requirements, as well as the solutions proposed and the performance evaluation.
The first service, named “Enhanced tele-assistance at home” has been designed to specifically
address the requirements of the elderly. It is composed by a gateway at home connected using land
and mobile lines. It supports several protocols, such as TT21 (dual tone multi-frequency signaling
or DTMF, and the sequential/single tone multi-frequency (STMF) protocol for mobile GSM/Next
Generation Networks (NGN) and Telecare Home Units), TT92 (DTMF and STMF), BS8521 (DTMF),
TTNEW (DTMF) so as to send/receive calls to/from the assistance center. In the home subsystem,
the gateway is connected through the sink to a wearable body sensor network (ZigBee) in order to
retrieve the body temperature, heart rate, and fall detector events. The system has been designed to
monitor several concurrent users in the same home; all these data are sent to the assistance center
through the Internet.
The second service is named “safe home” and it is addressed to a wide range of users. This
service is composed by a gateway at home connected to the assistance service through the Internet.
In the home subsystem, the gateway is connected through the sink to several sensors deployed
throughout the house (ZigBee) providing security alarms related to the indoor temperature, CO,
smoke, gas, water flood, as well as events related with open doors or windows. Those alarms can
be audible and addressed to an attention center to receive assistance. When a CO, smoke or gas
alarm is triggered, the actuators close the corresponding latch and open the windows.
The composite service: “Living at home longer, autonomously and safely” is basically composed
of both mentioned services, with some changes in several sensors, bearing in mind that this composite
service is designed for elderly people. The person’s health and the living environment must be
monitored. It is composed by the same gateway mentioned in the first service, with the capacity
to also manage the second service using the same gateway and sink.
6.1. DPIA-T for This Service
Since there is no Data Protection Impact Assessment-Template (DPIA-T) related with this service,
the expert system has to do the processing stages mentioned in Table 2. As said before, a composite
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service has its own security and privacy requirements, and can have substantial differences regarding
the individual services. Let us see the utility matrix in order to obtain the security and privacy
requirements (Tables 3 and 4).
Table 3. Utility Matrix: Service.
Utility Matrix: Description
Service name Living at home longer autonomously and safely.
Service Type Health-care; Safety
Environment Type Home
Country Spain
Promoter Joint venture: Health care and Home insurance companies
User Elder people
Monitored person People and rooms at home.
Legal capacity of person Full legal capacity
Special needs person Elder people with logical limitations, without special needs
Continuity of service Push button, critical sensors for life: CO, smoke, gas, presence sensorand outside door and windows open and critical sensor for service.
Critically of the service high
Network type NW_Type1
The network type must be defined also.
Table 4. Utility Matrix: Network type for the service.
Network Type: Living at Home Longer Autonomously and Safely
Network Type Name NW_Type1
Mote resources limit Wearable mote: Memory to store data on standalone operation
Connectivity Radio
Communications
Wearable mote—Gateway, via radio when push button is pressed to
call with assistant center. ZigBee connection between wearable node
and sink for send data via internet to the assistant center.
The home sensors—sync via ZigBee and connection via internet from
gateway to service provider. In case of CO, gas or smoke alarm, is
communicated to actuators to shut down the problem and open
outside window and send alarm to the person.
BS Resources Limit
None, when power is down, it has batteries and connections via GSM,
3G. In home there is an emergency battery for four hours (emergency
light and sensors power).
Topology Star
Nodes Roles
The wearable node has collected basically function
All nodes has collected basically function except window sensor node;
it has an actuator function to open outside window directly when CO,
gas or smoke are detected.
Routing Routing is unicast for all sensors to Gateway.
Security imperatives in DPIA-T Format, according to the Spanish (and European) legislation on
personal data protections are as follows [6]:
‚ Data related health must be protected or at least unlinked from the personal identity.
‚ Data must be fresh and true.
‚ The data related to the intimacy at home must be protected.
‚ Critical data for life safety are a priority.
The legal imperatives over sensitive information are structured in a DPIA-Template Security
service-Attacks-Defences type format (Table 5) in the case of our current service. Now is the time
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to assign the specific protections to the data set of the composite service (Table 6). There are several
changes compared with the individual services: a water flood can cause a fall, so it is considered as a
critical sensor in this composite service, as well as the presence in home and presence in bed. These
are important pieces of information so as to provide a good service for elderly people.
Table 5. Legal Imperatives in DPIA-T format.
DPIA-T: Living at Home Longer, Autonomously and Safely
Security Service Attack Target Defence
Availability DoS
1) The physical layer is
degraded and the
communication among nodes is
impossible (jamming). The situation must be
known to face it.2) A spurious node starts
sending malicious data packets
to the network.
Authentication
Sybil
A node is asking for multiple
IDs, and if the attack succeeds,
the node is able to subvert the
trust mechanism.
Restore trust mechanism
by rejecting the
malicious node.
Node replication
When a node ID is copied,
replicated in a new node, and
then introduced in the network.
From that moment on, the
network accepts the node with
the cloned ID as an
authorized node.
Realize and revoke the
malicious node.
False node
It introduces data traffic in the
network to stop legitimate
nodes from communicating
(injecting false data messages,
requesting authorization
continuously, etc.).
Identify the false node
and discard all
messages.
Integrity Message corruption
When a message reaches the
recipient with a different
content than the one sent by the
source. This situation is either
because the message has been
degraded in the transmission,
or because the message has
been intercepted and
intentionally changed.
Ensure that messages
have not been altered.
Privacy
Eavesdropping
Other devices listening in the
same frequency may intercept
all communications between
two nodes.
Provide authentication
and ciphering
capabilities.
Use data
anonymization.
Node subversion
When a node is captured and
cryptoanalyzed the secret keys,
node ID, security policies, and
so forth are disclosed.
Use few data stored in
each node and renew
the keys.
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Table 6. Data protection over data sets.
Sensor Reason Tipo Auth Integr Privacy Avail Intruders Insiders
1 Push button Emergency
Body
- - - Y -
2 Temperature
Private information Y Y Y Y
Y
3 heart rate
4 Fall detector
5 Temperature Auxiliary Information
Home
Y Y
-
Y
6 CO
Vital for life
-
7 Smoke -
8 Gas -
9 Water flood -
10 Door Vital for security
Y
11 Window
12 Presence
Vital for Service
13 Pres in bed
6.2. Security Services and Mechanisms
Once the data set protections of the composite service are assigned, the system must look for
the appropriate mechanisms in the knowledge base to face the attacks mentioned in the DPIA-T. For
these types of service and network, as shown in Table 4, the network type is a condition required to
choose the mechanism to be used. In this case, the parameter “mote resources limit”, has the value
“wearable mote”, and for these network types (in this case the mechanism must be lightweight) TSES
selectw the SensoTrust proposal [44] mechanisms. All used mechanismw in this example are able
to notify when an incident occurs. Each mechanism is evaluated, and assigned a value in the “Past
experiences” parameter “0” non effective mechanisms; “1” effective mechanism, it can be monitored,
manual reactions; “2” effective mechanism, it can be monitored, automatic reactions. This is based
on the trust domains definition where each of them has a common security policy. In this case the
domains are defined as follows: as we can see in the previous table, there are two major types of
security and privacy required, for each one a domain is defined as shown in Table 7. “Push button”
is out of domain because when the button is used the station makes a call outside the WSN.
Table 7. Trust domains defined.
Sensor Trust Domain Sensor Type
1 Push button Out of domains
Wearable
2 Temperature
Domain 1 Policy3 heart rate
4 Fall detector
5 Temperature
Domain 2 Policy
Home
6 CO
7 Smoke
8 Gas
9 Water flood
10 Door
Domain 1 Policy11 window
12 Presence
13 Presence in bed
After applying the legal imperatives (DPIA-T) to the current case, the following list of security
and privacy mechanisms arises, taking into account that it can be applied as the common scheme
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indicated (key distributed, roles and trust policies) in SensoTrust [44,45]. Each domain has its own
security and privacy policy as is shown in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8. Trust domain 1 policies.
Domain 1 Policy
Security Service Attack Countermeasure
Availability DoS Mech_DoS_1: One alarm is triggered in the SecurityManager informing about the situation
Authentication
Sybil
Mech_Sybil_1: In the security scheme, every node ID is
preconfigured for each node and only the Security Manager
(out of the WSN) has the complete list of the IDs. In extremis,
it is possible to perform a node revocation.
Node replication
It provides two mechanisms to avoid this attack.
Mech_N_Repl_1: The Node ID is stored in an external entity
(SM) that controls all the IDs working in the network.
Mech_N_Repl_2: Security policy, if the SM detects that two
nodes are operating with the same ID, a node revocation
protocol is issued, and the node is dropped from the network.
False node
Mech_N_False_1: Using the node ID, the schema is able to
identify the false node and, using the domain key renewal
functionality, all the messages sent by this node will be
discarded.
Integrity Message corruption
Mech_Msg_Corrupt_1: To avoid both issues, security
schema includes the ciphering suite functionality, which
allows performing a message hash (using MD5, SHA1, etc.).
Privacy
Eavesdropping
Mech_Eavers_1: To avoid data disclosure, it provides both
symmetric and PKI ciphering capabilities.
Mech_Eavers_2: Anonymization, unlinking the personal
identification and his/her measure data
Node subversion
Mech_N_Subv_1: To avoid it is to minimize the
cryptographic and security information stored in each node.
Nevertheless, all the keys in the network can be renewed.
Table 9. Trust domain 2 policies.
Domain 2 Policy
Availability DoS Mech_DoS_1
Authentication
Sybil Mech_Sybil_1
Node replication Mech_N_Repl_1
Mech_N_Repl_2
False node Mech_N_False_1
Integrity Message corruption Mech_Msg_Corrupt_1
Countermeasures against outsider attacks are based on authentication, and the countermeasures
against insider attacks are based on the security policies and the trust domains.
6.3. Performance Evaluation
To preserve the Quality of Service (QoS) it is necessary to know the limitations (Table 10). In
the sensor nodes used for the testing purposes, the maximum power computation was limited below
20%, since it was considered that 20% of this maximum value is able to ensure proper operation. With
Sybil and False node, the node load is keeping below the maximum limit defined.
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Table 10. Restrictions and limitations.
Sensor
Critical Requirement
Battery Delay
1 Push button
Y
N
2 Body Temperature
Y3 Heart rate
4 Fall detector
5 Home Temperature
N
N
6 CO
Y
7 Gas
8 Smoke
9 Water flood
10 Outside door
N
11 window
12 Presence at home
13 Presence in bed
The battery life is only important in case of Wearable devices, because gateway, sink and devices
in home have battery for emergency light and sensors with enough autonomy when the electric
power is fell down. The results have been obtained in laboratory for the policy more restrictive
(Figures 13 and 14). Finally, it is necessary that the system is designed to provide reports about both
the anomalies found (true + and ´, false + and ´) as their reactions.
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Respecting delays only wearable sensors, CO, Gas and smoke sensors are important while the
communication with the windows actuator is connected by wire.
Some indicators can be [46]:
‚ Percentile 90: The time until to solve the faults.
‚ Considering MTBF: Mean Time Between Failures (true positives + false negatives) and MTTR:
Mean Time To Repair (true positives + false negatives + false positives).
‚ MTTR over false positives represents the resources spent on inefficient results.
‚ The actuations on false negatives represent the impact when a problem is not detected on time.
‚ Coef (no attacks) ěMTBF/(MTBF + MTTR).
‚ Regarding the system behavior, it has obtained the following results (Tables 11 and 12).
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Table 11. Citizen protection impact and reaction.
Impact and Reaction:
Security Service Incidences Impact Resolution Time Pending
Authentication 7 1 Manually 0
Integrity 7 1 Manually 0
Privacy 7 2 Manually 0
Other incidences -
These used mechanisms in the application scenario only notify about the problem, and the
corrective actions are manual. Resolution time only appear for automatic actions. Respect to the
operation of the entire system, the results were as follows.
Table 12. System parts behavior.
BES: Users Perspective. Forms Validation
BES-USER interactionValidated Rejected Validation time
10 4 70 ms
BES: Making Utility Matrix 1st Part (Service)
Process and BES-LES interactionLES validations LES rejections Process time
6 0 4.2 s
BES: Making Utility Matrix 2nd Part (Network Type for the Service)
Process and BES-TSES
interaction
TSES validation TSES rejections Process time
6 0 3.2 s
LES: Validation Utility Matrix 1st Part
Internal Process onlyValidated Rejected Validation time
6 0 120 ms
LES: Making DPIA-T
Process and LES-TSES
interaction
TSES validations TSES rejections Process time
6 0 3.5 s
TSES: Validation DPIA-T
Internal Process onlyValidated Rejected Validation time
6 0 30 ms
TSES: Validation Utility Matrix 2nd Part
Internal Process onlyValidated Rejected Validation time
6 0 50 ms
TSES: Making Policies
Process and TSES-BES
interaction
BES validation Rejected Process time
6 0 7.8 s
TSES: Making Policies
Process and TSES-ACCUS
interaction
ACCUS validation Rejected Process time
6 0 12.1 s
Service Platform: Policy Validation
Accepted Rejected Validation time Internal process. is possible to do
it with the information received?6 0 340 ms
Service Platform: Actions Generated
Actuations completed Time to complete Generate the actuations and configure the testing nodes.
6 18.21 min
Ten services have been perfomed for this test, four of them had bad data, and the other six were
well done. Times are measured on viable services, because rejections are much faster. Interactions
include processing and the information transfer between them.
6.4. Providing the Obtained Results to the ACCUS Platform
Once the mechanisms have been selected, they must be provided to ACCUS platform in order
to continue the process and configure the service. The following lines present the process to
communicate the policy corresponding to trusted domain number 2.
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The selection criteria of security mechanisms are as follow for trust domain 2. The input and
output xml can be:
/*Input Model*/
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<in:input xmlns:in="http://www.grys.org/securityServicesIN">
<in:contextOfProtection>Smart Home Trust Domain 2</in:contextOfProtection>
<in:facestToProtect>
<in:facet> Temperature </in:facet>
<in:facet> CO </in:facet>
<in:facet> Smoke </in:facet>
<in:facet> Gas </in:facet>
<in:facet> Water Flood </in:facet>
</in:facestToProtect>
</in:input>
/*Output Model*/
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<out:recommendations xmlns:out="http://www.grys.org/securityServicesOUT">
<out:services>
<out:service>
<out:name id=”av”>Availabilitu</out:name>
<out:mechanism>
Mech_DoS_1
</out:mechanism>
</out:service>
<out:service>
<out:name id=”auth”>Authentication</out:name>
<out:mechanism>
Mech_Sybil_1
</out:mechanism>
<out:mechanism>
Mech_N_Repl_1
Mech_N_Repl_2
</out:mechanism>
<out:mechanism>
Mech_N_False_1
</out:mechanism>
</out:service>
<out:service>
<out:name id=”int”>Integrity</out:name>
<out:mechanism>
Mech_Msg_Corrupt_1
</out:mechanism>
</out:service>
</out:services>
<out:attacks>
<out:context> Smart Home</out:context>
<out:attack refTo=”av”>
<out:description> DoS </out:description>
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</out:attack>
<out:attack refTo=”auth”>
<out:description> Sybil </out:description>
<out:description> Node replication </out:description>
<out:description> False Node </out:description>
</out:attack>
<out:attack refTo=”int”>
<out:description> Message corruption </out:description>
</out:attack>
<out:secSerToImplement>
Availability Authentication Integrity
</out:secSerToImplement>
</out:attacks>
</out:recommendations>
All of this effort has secured only one smart service in the city. However, this process should be
iterated for all possible service combinations.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
Collaboration between multiple areas (business, legal and technological) is critical in order to
provide users with the necessary trust in the security of the service and protection of their personal
data. The limitation of resources of wireless sensor networks for products and services makes it
necessary to implement a tailored security schema to avoid the risk of poor quality of service when
resources are exhausted. In this way, the intelligent combination of security mechanisms available
could increase the service’s efficiency.
In an environment where several services and technologies coexist, the intelligence of the
decision-making on security policies could be integrated into the officially recognized and certified
network operations centre which would provide a large capacity of management, updating the
deployed security measures. Since there is no legislative uniformity, it is necessary to develop tools
and methods that permit a transition period with minimal risk to people and their rights.
When citizens’ quality of life greatly depends on the correct performance of smart cities, which,
in turn, depend on the correct performance of systems and services (and the networks in which they
are set up), it might be required to configure and reconfigure privacy and security policies. It may
be due to changes in states of emergency, alarm, etc. Or, they may be necessary because of dynamic
changes within the city. Therefore, it is important to know timely and in due form the security policies
that must be implemented in each case, in a reliable way, by the expert system described. It would
also be convenient to deploy and perform the actions needed on the elements of the city, fast and
efficiently (decreasing human intervention to a minimum), using the mediation chain described. The
key lies in the cooperative environment between the three main knowledge areas described, and in
a common management, even if the systems are technically duplicated or diversified to augment
security and availability.
It must be considered that, in an uncertain future, a failure in the performance of a smart city may
be disastrous and could have serious consequences; far from just a mild annoyance, it could result
in the endangerment of people and infrastructure. A service under attack or functioning incorrectly
may activate an alarm, with no emergency triggering it. Therefore, investing in security, privacy and
reliability in the performance of systems in a smart city may be worthwhile.
In the future, we will point in different directions according to the road map. On the expert
system side knowledge bases should be enhanced to make possible interactions between IoT
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platforms and several technologies. Also is will be necessary to make life easier for the human experts
providing them nice tools to manage the information. ACCUS must go on with its road map, to
improve the functionalities to create new services in the smart city environment. Those new services
represent good opportunities for both systems to work together to face new issues.
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